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TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE
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REMARKS:	

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FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)
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Registry
82-13088

16 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM: [redacted] 25X1
Executive Director

SUBJECT: CIA Military Reserve Program

1. Following our discussion last summer on the need for an EXCOM review of the Agency's military reserve program, my Planning Staff developed a concept (Tab A) for the wartime use of CIA military reservists. Preliminary Directorate comments on this concept were sought through Interdirectorate Planning Group channels. The Directorates indicated conceptual agreement and the need for a communications capability not addressed in the concept. Copies of their comments are at Tab B. While this concept for the use of our reservists appears to be sound, there may be practical problems in preparing for and implementing such a concept that the EXCOM needs to understand before any decision on the future direction of this program is made. There is some concern that the Agency does not now appear to have a military reserve program for its employees that takes full advantage of their military training, experience, and contacts and the opportunity to provide an effective contingency capability for wartime operations; and, as a result, the Agency could lose the services of many employees due to mobilization commitments outside CIA.

2. I would appreciate it if you could prepare a study for EXCOM discussion early next year on the CIA military reserve program which would include the following:

a. A summary of the present program: its rationale, numbers and source of its personnel, value to the Agency of its activities, growth or shrinkage - past and anticipated, costs to the Agency [redacted] and anticipated effect on Agency activities of their mobilization. 25X1

b. A summary of Agency personnel who are active reservists with mobilization assignments other than to the Agency: numbers of such personnel, units of mobilization assignment [redacted] and the anticipated effect on Agency activities of their mobilization. 25X1

ALL PORTIONS SECRET [redacted] 25X1

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c. An organizational, training, and administrative plan for implementing the concept in Tab A. This plan should identify ways of providing adequate security and cover for the program.

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[redacted]

Attachments

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/atts
1 - ER w/atts
1 - ExDir w/atts
1 - PS (Military Planning) w/atts
[redacted] (16 November 1982)

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2 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Interdirectorate Planning Group

FROM: Chairman, IPG

SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists

1. With the passage of time, the rationale developed during the 1950s for the establishment and maintenance of a CIA military reserve force for the purpose of generating sizeable OSS-like, unconventional forces overseas seems less persuasive. Steady reductions in the number of CIA personnel active in the Agency's military reserve program and questions raised concerning the effectiveness of [redacted] this program has prompted the Director of Personnel to propose that the Executive Committee review the wartime rationale, current value, effect on other Agency activities, and costs of such a program. We have agreed that the first step in such a review would be the identification of a wartime role for Agency reservists. While other roles (such as support [redacted] development of contingency unconventional warfare units, etc) might well be considered, I agreed to circulate the attached concept for your review and comment. 25X1 25X1

2. I would appreciate your preliminary reaction to this concept or suggestions on alternate wartime roles for CIA military reservists by 17 September.

[redacted] 25X1

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A Concept for Wartime Use of CIA Military Reservists

1. As you know, CIA faces major uncertainties in planning for wartime mobilization. However, it is reasonable to assume that any emergency sufficiently grave to warrant military mobilization would require CIA to not only increase its intelligence and operational activities in support of the President and the National Security Council, but to increase its intelligence and operational support to U.S. military commands. If it is also reasonable to presume that CIA would need to provide this additional wartime support quickly, then the Agency would need to use the personnel and equipment available to it at the time. An Agency military reserve program which provides CIA with a pool of manpower trained and experienced in both Agency and military intelligence skills, organization, and procedures, and available for immediate duty at the call of the Director would materially aid in meeting such a contingency requirement.

2. One of many ways that the Agency could increase its support to and improve its coordination with U.S. military forces deployed in the field would be through the use of CIA liaison elements established and located with major military command headquarters at the Unified Command and Joint Task Force level. This would be consistent with formal agreements between CIA and DoD for mutual support. These agreements provide that prior to or during a contingency situation requiring coordinated efforts of CIA and DoD, a Unified Command or subordinate military command may request a liaison element from CIA.

3. CIA military reserve personnel could be organized and trained with military commands to staff these liaison elements. Those Agency reservists who are not otherwise required for high priority wartime tasks by CIA could be made available for this purpose.

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DD/A Registry
82-2165/8

S-E-C-R-E-T

17 SEP 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Interdirectorate Planning Group

FROM: [redacted] 25X1
DDA Representative
Interdirectorate Planning Group

SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists

REFERENCE: Memo from Chairman, IPG to Interdirectorate Planning Group, dtd 2 Sept 82, Same Subject

1. Reference "concept" calls for approximately [redacted] support personnel 25X1
to be assigned to [redacted] liaison elements. A definitive evaluation of the 25X1
"concept" is hindered by the lack of specificity as to what type of support (e.g., administrative, logistics, communications, etc.) would be required, the type of reservist needed, and the number and type of Agency reservists available in the Agency's reserve program. Additionally, it is extremely difficult to evaluate a "concept" for a wartime role for CIA military reserve force without a clear and current "concept" of the wartime role of the Agency.

2. With the above preface, the following comments are offered:

a. If there is a concurrent need within the Agency and DoD for Agency military reservists to be assigned to DoD during a national emergency, then the concept of forming CIA liaison elements for duty with the major military command headquarters appears to have some merit.

b. On the other hand, if in fact we are forming true "liaison" units, do they really require uniformed personnel? Why not use Agency civilians? It would seem that the training, skill, and experiences of the civilian job function (i.e., Intelligence Analyst) would be much more germane than the military reserve specialty.

c. In a practical sense, if this proposal is adopted, it would be of utmost importance that the chain of command and channels of communication be clearly defined. Also, consideration should be given to the difference in pay scale that some of our personnel might experience.

d. Special care would have to be taken in selecting personnel to balance the priority of their Agency civilian role and that of their military reservist role.

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED SECRET [redacted] 25X1

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3. Attached herewith is a memorandum from the Office of Communications giving their comments.

4. A suggested alternative for the wartime role of Agency military reservists would be to get approval to keep them under Agency command and not release them to their military service. This has the advantage of lessening the difficulty the Agency will encounter in surge staffing for a national emergency.

5. Any further consideration of this "concept" should be integrated into an exploration and updating of the CIA wartime mission.

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Attachment

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DD/A Registry
82-2165/7

OCPS-M82-021
13 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDA Plans Officer

FROM: [redacted] 25X1
Chief, Planning Staff, OC

SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists [redacted] 25X1

REFERENCES: A. DD/A 82-2165/1
B. ER-82-5823

1. The requested comments relative to communications support to the proposed Agency military reserve program are difficult. Although the discussion paper is conceptual rather than specific, it proposes that "These groups would have to be augmented by Office of Communications people and equipment, ..." (Para 4, Reference B). Augmentation could, however, range over a broad spectrum. It is important to assess the potential magnitude of the resources suggested by the proposal, lest they be misunderstood since, communications support to a CIA/Military reserve unit could require a significant percentage of the initial and recurring costs of such a capability. Thus, the discussion in this paper is based on several assumptions which are explored in the following paragraphs; if these assumptions prove inappropriate, this could significantly alter the paper's conclusions. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists [redacted] 25X1

2. As the concept paper implies, a wartime role of a CIA/Military reserve program would be in a conventional, limited war scenario and would be largely independent of Agency responsibilities in a PD-58 style total nuclear war. The concept of "calling up the reserves" implies that there is time for mobilization, that reservists are not engaged in other wartime duties, and that the support elements (in this case OC) are available and are not otherwise committed. Wartime conditions also demand flexibility, mobility and "readiness." Of the two obvious approaches to providing communications support--reliance on military units and the provision of a separate capability--past experience and logical projections strongly argue for a CIA OC professionally staffed communications detachment to provide the needed support. [redacted] 25X1

3. Such a commitment of personnel must be specifically integrated into the OC infrastructure to assure that at least one-half of the needed communicators would be immediately available. These people must be free of any obligation to support other duties (e.g., PD-58, surge collection, [redacted] 25X1 or simply other priority ongoing Agency commitments) and must be properly trained to be effective when deployed. To obtain the remaining half of the needed communicators, CIA could use conscripted military communicators who could be ready in two to three months. Alternatively, new Agency employees or untrained military would need over a year for training and clearances. OC is not optimistic that this number of recruits could be obtained from the military in a wartime situation and some upward adjustment of the onboard complement would be needed. We suggest the one-half to be immediately responsive. Further, it is not likely that all [redacted] teams would be formed and deployed in all conflict 25X1 situations. Finally, we use the one-half concept because it is a number which could be gainfully employed in peacetime duties. [redacted] 25X1

4. Mobility of operations is a key ingredient in our concept to provide communications support to a CIA/Military reserve team in a fluid military environment. The suggested method for achieving the needed flexibility would be to install a full communications support capability in mobile [redacted] In 25X1 peacetime the [redacted] would be based at a suitable 25X1 location for ease of transportation and maintenance. In a wartime situation communicators and the mobile comcenters would be flown to the location where they were needed. [redacted] 25X1 would be transported atop standard military 2 1/2-ton trucks.

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SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] would be needed for each comcenter. These would contain HF carrier equipment, communications terminal processing equipment, repair facility, and spare parts. Each truck would also be required to have a trailer attached; two trailers would be for emergency power generation and two for fuel. For a visual overview, please see the attached illustration. [redacted] 25X1 25X1 25X1

[redacted]

7. The peacetime role envisioned for the communications support teams is similar to the role of active duty military support teams for other reserve units. Their main responsibility would be to maintain the personnel, procedural and technical readiness of the communications teams and equipment. This is seen to require systematic exercising of all the systems to assure reliability of equipment as well as attain the needed amounts of specific training. Basing these units in the United States would allow them to be used for these reserve training

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SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists [redacted] 25X1

purposes (including the annual team training exercises); they could also be operationally deployed on short notice for emergencies short of nuclear war.

8. OC is confident that quality communications support could be provided to any realistic CIA/Military reserve program provided the program was adequately planned and it obtained a sufficient commitment of resources. It is realized, however, that requisite support could be seen by some to be expensive. Expense notwithstanding, the costs for the required support should be balanced against the total Agency/National requirement.

[redacted] 25X1

Attachment:
As stated

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17 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] 25X1
Chairman, Interdirectorate Planning Group

FROM : [redacted] 25X1
DDI Representative to the Interdirectorate Planning Group

SUBJECT : Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists

1. The wartime role for Agency reservists outlined in your concept paper of 2 September is logical and should be endorsed by the Interdirectorate Planning Group. While no one can accurately predict exactly what the Agency's wartime responsibilities will be, it clearly will be called upon to provide increased support to the military commands--operational and analytical. We have already seen a steady growth in the requirement to provide this type of support during peacetime and a wartime environment will only increase this demand. Agency reservists, properly trained, can provide the manpower to support this expanded war-time relationship. Their experience and knowledge of the military environment make them ideally suited to this role. It is a pool of expertise, therefore, that can be easily tapped and can help to ease the Agency's transition to a war-time footing. With the renewed emphasis on contingency planning in government, it seems logical that we reshape our reserve program to play this role.

2. Aside from wartime, the DDI feels that Agency reservists also make valuable peacetime contributions to the Agency. By virtue of their reserve affiliation, they can effectively represent the Agency's views and interests in arenas in which the Agency normally would not have access. They help to improve our relations with the military services, while gaining insights into field staff operations which are useful in their Agency assignments. We feel that participation in the Agency reserve program provides a valuable experience for our officers and endorse the continuation of the program. We have encountered no problems in having employees affiliated with the CIA reserve program and in fact have found it to be a useful asset.

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S E C R E T

17 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Interdirectorate Planning Group

25X1 FROM : Chief,
25X1 DDO

SUBJECT : Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists

REFERENCE : Chairman, IPG Memo of 2 September 1982

1. Following discussions with the Associate Deputy Director for Operations and the Chief of the Directorate of Operations' Career Management Staff, preliminary reactions were favorable to your concept paper on a wartime role for CIA military reservists. The Directorate of Operations could contribute to the program as outlined.

2. We would welcome more discussions as the concept is formed into a more detailed plan.

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DDS&T-3944-82
17 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Interdirectorate Planning Group

FROM: [redacted] 25X1
Acting Chief, Planning Division, PRS/DDS&T

SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists

REFERENCE: Memo for IPG from Chairman, IPG dated 2 September 1982, same subject

1. I have reviewed your memo referenced above and offer the following comments.

2. Your concept for wartime use of CIA military reservists seems, in general, to be a reasonable one, although perhaps too structured for this early phase of the review. For example, the exact numbers of people and the distribution of disciplines could easily be altered and might better be determined after the general concept is more clearly defined.

3. To conduct an in-depth review of this subject would, in my opinion, require a more rigorous analysis than permitted in this brief period of time. The principal role in such a review would probably be played by the Office of Personnel. Further, any planning for the use of military reservists in a wartime or emergency situation must be closely coordinated with, and may be 25X1 dependent upon [redacted]

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D/Pers
82-8498

4 October 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] 25X1
Chairman, Interdirectorate Planning Group

FROM: [redacted] 25X1
Deputy Director for Policy,
Analysis and Evaluation/OP

SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists

REFERENCE: Memo from Chairman, IPG, Same Subject,
Dated 2 September 1982 (ER #82-5823)

The proposal by the Chairman, Interdirectorate Planning Group, seems a reasonable and logical wartime role for CIA military reservists and one that should receive senior Agency management review. In the review of this proposal we have noted some problems such as the need for coordination with service entities, modification to the thrust of the Agency's reserve program, and, a change in the military specialities of the present reserve force.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Interdirectorate Planning Group

FROM: [redacted] 25X1
Acting Chief, Analysis Group

SUBJECT: Wartime Role for CIA Military Reservists

1. I am responding to your concept for a wartime role for CIA reservists both as a long-time member of the Agency reserve and as a representative of the Comptroller's Office who has reviewed a number of Agency-wide programs as to their cost effectiveness. [redacted] 25X1

2. The concept of Regional Cooordination Groups appears to be basically sound, and, based on my experience, would be attractive to the Department of Defense. There are, of course, other possible roles for CIA reservists in wartime--as you note in your cover memo--but the RCG's would provide maximum flexibility to both Defense and CIA. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

4. On the broader question of the value of an Agency sponsored reserve unit, I would observe that the same rationale that has been cited in every instance in which the worth of the agency reserve unit has been challenged still applies. In brief, it is that both the military services and the Agency benefit from a program that enables Agency employees to maintain their reserve status by participating in an in-house program that permits for full utilization of their intelligence skills and experience, furnishes unique training opportunities in military skills [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] The Agency benefits by having a substantial number of its 25X1
members familiar with current military thinking and practices and by widening its working level contacts with the Department of Defense and various U S commands. The individual reservist has his experience substantially broadened

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by participation in the reserve program, particularly through active duty tours. (In Admiral Inman's view, this fact alone is sufficient justification for a separate Agency military reserve unit). On its side, the Department of Defense has the advantage of having experienced professional intelligence officers serving in their organizations both at the Headquarters and field level. Through the Special Projects Program, DOD gets a more tangible product; namely, a number of classified studies that are produced by Agency specialists using resources not readily available to non-Agency employees.

25X1

5. Although a detailed cost benefit analysis has not been conducted by the reserve unit itself, it seems unlikely that the direct cost of Agency sponsorship is more than per year. This estimate includes the cost of military leave for Reserve Officers taking two-week active duty tours. The principal Agency commitment is in the form of administrative support from the Military Personnel Branch a component which already exists to meet the administrative needs of military detailees to the Agency. The price of the program does not seem to be high when measured against the advantages outlined above, and the continued strong backing the program receives from both active duty and reserve elements of the military services. It is quite possible that the Agency could realize substantially greater benefit from the reserve program if it set forth its objectives and requirements more clearly. Only time will tell if this will happen.

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